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Abstract
Users of the social networking service Facebook have the possibility to post status updates
for their friends to read. In turn, friends may react to these short messages by writing comments
or by pressing a Like button to show their appreciation. Making use of ﬁve Swedish accounts,
we set up a natural ﬁeld experiment to study whether users are more prone to Like an update if
someone else has done so before. We distinguish between three diﬀerent treatment conditions:
(i) one unknown user Likes the update, (ii) three unknown users Like the update and (iii) one
peer Likes the update. Whereas the ﬁrst condition had no eﬀect, both the second and the third
increased the probability to express a positive opinion by a factor of two or more, suggesting
that both number of predecessors and social proximity matters. We identify three reasonable
explanations for the observed herding behavior and isolate conformity as the primary mechanism
in our experiment.
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1 Introduction
Whenever a new trend arises—be it within fashion, on product markets or even in politics—it is
relevant to ask if the popularity is explained by better quality or if it simply reﬂects a desire people
have to do what everyone else does. The latter supposition, if true, has wide implications since
it could explain, among other things, the formation of asset bubbles and dramatic shifts in voting
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1behavior. Unfortunately, identifying herding behavior is by its nature diﬃcult and hence we know
little about the importance of this phenomenon.
In this paper, we use the world’s leading social networking service, Facebook, to study herding.
Each Facebook user has a network of friends with whom he or she may easily interact through
several diﬀerent channels, e.g., by mailing, chatting or uploading photos or links. The most popular
feature allows users to post status updates for friends to read; in turn, friends may react to these
short messages by writing their own comments or by pressing a Like button to show they enjoyed
reading it. We set up a natural ﬁeld experiment to study whether users are more willing to Like
an update if someone else has done so before. Making use of ﬁve Swedish users’ actual accounts,
we create 44 updates in total during a seven month period.1 For every new update, we randomly
assign our user’s friends into either a treatment or a control group; hence, while both groups are
exposed to identical status updates, treated individuals see the update after someone (controlled
by us) has Liked it whereas individuals in the control group see it without anyone doing so. We
separate between three diﬀerent treatment conditions: (i) one unknown user Likes the update, (ii)
three unknown users Like the update and (iii) one peer Likes the update. Our motivation for
altering treatments is that it enables us to study whether the number of previous opinions as well
as social proximity matters.2 The result from this exercise is striking: whereas the ﬁrst treatment
condition left subjects unaﬀected, both the second and the third more than doubled the probability
of Liking an update, and these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant.
We argue that conformity explains the behavior we observe in our experiment. Economists have
deﬁned conformity as an intrinsic taste to follow others (Goeree and Yariv, 2010), driven by factors
such as popularity, esteem and respect (Bernheim, 1994). As Bernheim’s model suggests, actions
that are publicly observable signal predispositions and therefore aﬀect status. Hence, if status
concerns are suﬃciently important to individuals, they will deviate from self-serving preferences and
conform.3 For many reasons, Facebook constitutes an environment where conformity potentially
would occur. First it provides high visibility—at any given time, a large number of users observe
each other’s actions—allowing signaling to occur. Second, much of the activity on the website
revolves around expressing attitudes and beliefs which are likely to be important for projecting
status. Third, since there is no obvious way for users to disagree once a norm is established (i.e.,
no dislike option exist), conformity pressure is unlikely to weaken over time.
Besides conformity, herding has been explained by: (i) correlated preferences, (ii) payoﬀ exter-
nalities, (iii) limited attention and (iv) observational learning. We eliminate correlated eﬀects due
to the random assignment into treatment and control groups (see discussion in Cai et al., 2009).
1The experiment took place between May and October 2010. The accounts we used were not created for the
purpose of the experiment but rather borrowed from existing users.
2Social impact theory developed in Latané (1981) lists three important factors determining the size of social
inﬂuence: strength, immediacy and number. Moreover, previous ﬁndings from social psychology show that the more
unanimous predecessors are, the more likely it is that subsequent decision-makers follow suit (Asch, 1955). Finally,
there is convincing evidence that peers can play an important role in determining behavior (see e.g., Bandiera et al.,
2005; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Sacerdote, 2001; Kremer and Levy, 2008).
3Of course, people may also be inclined to express their independence by choosing a less popular option. Evidence
of such behavior is found in Ariely and Levav (2000), Corazzini and Greiner (2007) and Weizsacker (2010).
2Payoﬀ externalities cause herding when each agent’s actions aﬀect other agents’ payoﬀs in such a
way that an equilibrium arises. One typical example is right-hand (or left-hand) traﬃc. This expla-
nation can also be ruled out as there is no reason for supposing such payoﬀs arise in our setting (the
absence of any equilibrium in type or number of responses in our experiment as well as on Facebook
in general speaks against this explanation). Arguably the other two mechanisms are more relevant
in our experiment and we therefore address them in more detail.
Limited attention is relevant in situations where agents make an optimal choice after delimiting
the choice set (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2008; Ariely and Simonsohn, 2008;
DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). We consider two cases—saliency and searching. Status updates on
Facebook that someone has responded to may be more salient because of their altered physical
appearance (a blue rectangular area is added beneath the update).4 Consequently, updates in
treatment groups may have a higher probability of being read and this in turn could translate into
more responses. However, the three treatment conditions we use aﬀect the saliency of updates
identically and since there is no treatment eﬀect for one of the conditions, saliency cannot explain
our results. Searching, on the other hand, would be an appropriate explanation if users want to
save time or eﬀort by looking for previous responses in order to ﬁnd the best status updates quickly.
Such screening will again increase the reading probability for updates in treatment groups, but since
response behavior should be unaﬀected, we expect a treatment eﬀect for both types of responses
(Likes and comments). It turns out comments are unaﬀected in all of our treatment conditions and
thus there is little support for the searching mechanism either.
Observational learning models ﬁt situations where successors follow those who are believed to be
better informed because this constitutes a best response.5 The key assumption is that agents obtain
information by observing each other’s actions and this in turn helps them maximize intrinsic utility
(for theoretical studies, see Banerjee, 1992 and Bikhchandani et al., 1992; for empirical evidence,
see e.g., Anderson and Holt, 1997 and Alevy et al., 2007). We argue that in our setting, where
subjects choose whether to Like a status update or not, observational learning is unlikely to exist.
The obvious reason being that choices in our experiment are made after subjects have experienced
the “product” and have been able to evaluate it against comparable alternatives. In essence, people
have all the tools required to make a private quality assessment instantly without the need for
information signals. Although we are unable to directly address this channel, we present ﬁndings
which support this argument.
Our study is related to two diﬀerent strands of literature within the economics discipline. On
the one hand, we build on a growing body of experimental studies on herding behavior in diﬀerent
real-life settings, on the other, we tie in with the peer-eﬀect literature.
Cialdini et al. (1990), Goldstein et al. (2008), Ayres et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2010) all study
4The term saliency comes from neuroscience. The saliency of an item is the quality by which it stands out relative
to its neighbors.
5Note the diﬀerence between limited attention and observational learning. The former refers to a situation where
subjects are certain of the quality of an update after reading it but use some (conscious or subconscious) rule to
shrink the choice set. The latter, on the other hand, is relevant if subjects, after reading an update, are unsure of its
quality.
3decisions related to public goods (littering, resource usage and contributions to an online commu-
nity). Hence, the eﬀects found could be explained by either conformity or conditional cooperation,
or both. Salganik et al. (2006) set up an artiﬁcial online music market and show that previous down-
loads positively aﬀect an individual’s tendency to download a speciﬁc song. The eﬀect is mainly
driven by the fact that frequently downloaded songs are listed higher up on the website, i.e., are
more salient. When position is independent of number of downloads, the eﬀect is weaker, suggesting
that limited attention is the prime explanation for their results. Cai et al. (2009) vary information
on menus in a Chinese restaurant chain to separate observational learning from saliency. Since there
is an eﬀect on demand when the ﬁve most popular dishes are displayed but not when ﬁve randomly
dishes are highlighted, the authors interpret the results in favor of observational learning. Martin
and Randal (2008) varies the amount of money (and mixture of coins and bills) in a transparent
box, used to collect voluntary visiting fees in an art gallery, to analyze how visitors’ contributions
are aﬀected. However, no attempt is made to distinguish between diﬀerent explanations. What
separates our study is that we exploit a situation without payoﬀ equilibria and where observational
learning is negligible. Since status concerns are likely to be important, our focus is on conformity
and how conformity pressures forms attitudes and beliefs.
The research on peer eﬀects has found that peers may play an important role in aﬀecting
for example productivity at work (Bandiera et al., 2005 and Mas and Moretti, 2009) and savings
decisions (Duﬂo and Saez, 2002, 2003). We show that social proximity is also important when it
comes to expressing conforming preferences. Moreover, contrary to many previous studies, we oﬀer
a precise deﬁnition of what we mean by a peer; rather than just saying he or she is a colleague or a
roommate, we use the degree centrality condition.6 This means we are able to explicitly study the
role of what can be seen as a central person in a network of friends.
In a broader sense, this study is motivated by a growing interest in social interactions within
economics. Starting with Becker’s (1974) critique of traditional economic theory for neglecting the
importance of social interactions, researchers have long tried to gain further insights into this aspect
of human life. According to Manski (2000), theorist’s have succeeded quite well whereas empirical
research is lagging behind, mostly because identiﬁcation generally has been too challenging. Man-
ski’s main conclusion is that more knowledge would be gained with well-designed experiments in
controlled environments (Soetevent, 2006, concludes with a similar argument). Our hope is that this
study will increase our understanding of herding behavior in general and conformity in particular,
and encourage further research on these and other related topics.
The paper evolves as follows. Section 2 describes Facebook while section 3 presents the experi-
mental design. Section 4 and 5 summarizes the data and presents the main ﬁndings. In Section 6
we discuss our results in a broader context and section 7 concludes.
6As e m i n a lp a p e ro nd i ﬀ e r e n tc e n t r a l i t yc o n d i t i o n si sF r e e m a n( 1 9 7 9 ) .
42 About Facebook
Facebook is the leading social networking site.7 The largest countries according to number of total
users are the US (150 million), Indonesia (34 million) and the UK (28 million). Sweden has around
4 million users meaning penetration is about the same as in North America (somewhere between
40-50 percent).8 Currently, the website is the second most visited of all and it has attracted
increasing attention as a marketing channel both within politics and the corporate environment.
The company’s own statistics report that the average user has 130 friends, spends over one day per
month on Facebook and creates 90 pieces of content each month (e.g., links, blog posts, notes and
photo albums). Moreover, 50 percent of what Facebook deﬁnes as active users log on to the website
in any given day.
Ultimately, Facebook is an arena for people who seek to interact with their network of friends.
Other users are added to your network when they accept your Friend Request. Once you have become
friends you may visit each other’s proﬁles and can easily interact through diﬀerent channels, e.g.
by mailing, chatting or uploading photos or links. The most popular feature, Status, allows users to
inform their friends of their whereabouts and actions in status updates. These short messages are
made visible to friends on the News Feed which displays updates as Most Recent or as Top News.9
Immediately after it has been posted, friends may react to a status update either by writing their
own comments or by pressing a Like button to show their appreciation. Both types of responses
show up together with the update and are thus clearly visible to the user who wrote the update
and his or her network of friends. A status update is limited to 420 characters (including spaces),
which means they are typically short, in most cases one sentence. Moreover, a majority of updates
are current—they reveal for example what the user is doing right now or where he or she is—which
means any reactions from friends are unlikely to show up after more than one or two days (the fact
that none of the updates we used in the experiment generated any response after 20 hours conﬁrms
this).
The Like button was introduced in February 2009 and quickly became a widely popular way
for users to express positive opinions about shared content. Facebook’s own description of how this
feature works is as follows:
We’ve just introduced an easy way to tell friends that you like what they’re sharing
7comScore reports the website attracted 130 million unique visitors in May 2010 and Goldman Sachs estimates
the website has more than 600 million users in total as of January 2011.
8The exact numbers varies depending on source. Figures reported here are from CheckFacebook.com which,
although not aﬃliated with Facebook, claims to use data from its advertising tool.
9When we ran the experiment in 2010, users could choose between the alternative views themselves and easily
change between them (see Figure 5 in the Appendix). Moreover, according to Facebook, the Top News algorithm was
based on “how many friends are commenting on a certain piece of content, who posted the content, and what type
of content it is (e.g. photo, video, or status update)” (see http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=408). This means
the number of Likes did not determine if a status update appeared on Top News or not. During the experiment, we
conﬁrmed that this was the case. In light of this, it should be mentioned that Facebook continuously changes the
interface of the website (arguably in order to develop and improve its functionality). A major change occurred in
September 2011 which altered the way the News Feed presents information. This means there are some discrepancies
between the presentation of Facebook in this paper (which is based on how things were in 2010) and its current
format. Importantly, no major changes were made during the experimental period in 2010.
5on Facebook with one easy click. Wherever you can add a comment on your friends’
content, you’ll also have the option to click "Like" to tell your friends exactly that: “I
like this.”
Leah Pearlman, The Facebook Blog
We include a print screen in the Appendix to show the way the News Feed presents recent status
updates in reverse chronological order (Figure 5). As seen in this ﬁgure, the ﬁrst update has no
responses while the second has received a comment and the third a Like.
3 The Experiment
Posting a status update on Facebook usually means all of your friends can see it. However, each
user has the possibility to control who sees a speciﬁc update through privacy settings. Thus, if
users wish, they can create a subset of friends, e.g., family members or close friends, and write
the message to this group only. We use this feature in our experiment since it allows us to post
identical status updates, simultaneously, to diﬀerent groups—in our case treatment and control
groups. Importantly, members of a group can only follow the communication within the speciﬁc
group and this communication is displayed as normal to the selected members. Hence, we do not
worry that subjects perceive the status updates we post within the experiment diﬀerently from the
ordinary stream of information on the News Feed.
We post 44 status updates in total during a seven month period using ﬁve Swedish Facebook
accounts.10 Table 1 brieﬂy describes the six steps we go through each time we post an update (every
time we execute the process, we use one account which means the 44 updates are distributed over
the ﬁve accounts). We do not want updates to stand out but rather be a natural part of the ongoing
communication on the website. Therefore, in the ﬁrst step, we ask one of our ﬁve users to text his or
her status update to us whenever we decide it is time.11 From the list of examples given in Table 7 in
the Appendix, we see that updates are trivial in the sense that they are short, easy to interpret and
do not say anything which could be perceived as “sensitive”, such as political opinions or religious
views.12 In the second step, after receiving the content for a status update, we randomly draw one
of three types of treatment conditions: (i) one unknown user Likes the update, (ii) three unknown
users Like the update, or (iii) one peer Likes the update. Our motivation for using three diﬀerent
treatments is to ﬁnd out if the number of people expressing their opinion and social proximity is
10Note that we have access to more than ﬁve accounts in total (see discussion about the peer and unknown users
below). All users were aware of the experiment and they personally gave us access to their accounts. We were very
strict about anonymity, i.e., we instructed them under no circumstances to reveal anything about our research.
11We explicitly instructed our users not to think of this as an update that would be used within an experiment. In
fact, they themselves stressed that it was important that the updates we used expressed something they would have
posted anyway, arguably because they did not want to gain a bad reputation by letting us post updates which they
could not stand for. In some few cases, we came up with the content for a status update and then asked our users if
we could use it.
12We want to study behavior in the simplest possible setting. It would be interesting in further research to see if
conformity depends on the type of update but this question is outside the scope of this study.
6important for the decision to Like an update. Randomization in this step means we can eliminate
systematic diﬀerences in updates between treatments. The third step implies random assignment
of subjects into either a control or a treatment group. In the fourth and the ﬁfth step, we post
the status update in treatment and control groups, and immediately expose treated subjects to the
condition that was drawn in step 2.13 Finally, we collect data on responses.
An interesting feature of our experiment is that subjects have the possibility of responding in
diﬀerent ways, by Liking, commenting or both. Although we have three outcomes, our focus is on
Likes. Compared to comments, which in some cases are quite complex, this response is easy to
interpret and there is little doubt it captures what we want to measure: whether a person is more
likely to express a positive opinion if someone else has done so before. We use comments in later
analysis however to separate between diﬀerent explanations for the observed behavior (see section
5.2).
Table 1: The experimental process
Step Description
1 Ask for a status update from one of our ﬁve users
2 Random draw of one out of three treatment conditions
3 Random assignment of the user’s friends into treatment and control groups
4 Post identical status updates in treatment and control groups
5 Expose treated subjects to the condition drawn in step 2
6 Collect data on responses
To give a better sense of the three treatment conditions we use, Figure 1 provides a graphical
illustration (note that one treatment is used for each update, i.e., updates vary between treatments).
Treatment Tone, one unknown user Liking the update, is illustrated at the top of the ﬁgure. We
randomly assign our user’s set of friends, F, into two equally sized groups, the control group, C,
and the treatment group, T.14 We expose both groups to identical status updates but for treated
individuals we add a Like made by an unknown user.15 The ﬁgure shows how the update is displayed
in each of the two groups on Facebook’s News Feed. Since this treatment reveals only one person’s
opinion and the person is a complete unknown, we think of this as the lowest possible trigger.
It is reasonable to assume that inﬂuence increases if predecessors are more unanimous (see
Latané, 1981 and Asch, 1955). A natural extension, therefore, is to add more Likes to updates.
The middle section of the ﬁgure illustrates treatment Tthree where we increase the number of people
liking the update to three. Importantly, we still want the users who Like the update to be unknown
13Note that updates are Liked by one (or three) of the users’ accounts available to us, i.e., we press the Like button
using the accounts we have access to.
14To be more speciﬁc, we create four groups of equal size, two control and two treatment groups. The reason for
clustering treatment and control groups into smaller entities is twofold. First, for practical reasons it was easier to
handle smaller groups. Second, we wanted spontaneous communication in control groups to start as late as possible.
Larger control groups increase the probability that someone Likes the update at any given time and if this happens,
subjects in control groups are in some sense treated. A typical cluster contains around 30 subjects.
15The unknown users are people we added to our ﬁve users’ networks of friends. They were chosen in such a way
that we are certain they are unknown to all subjects.
7to subjects since this implies it is straightforward to compare results from the ﬁrst two treatment
conditions. If there turns out to be a diﬀerence in eﬀects, we can learn something about whether
the number of persons expressing their opinion matters. Again, we randomly assign friends into
either a treatment or a control group and we expose both groups to identical status updates (note
that this implies subjects’ treatment status varies between updates). Our decision to add exactly
three Likes in this treatment condition has several reasons. First, increasing them one step at the
time would have been too time-consuming. Further, we want to signal to some extent that the
update in question is popular without making it stand out too much in the News Feed.F i n a l l y ,t h e
seminal studies by Solomon Asch (Asch, 1952, 1955, 1956) on how subjects change private answers to
simple questions when exposed to group opinions show three confederates have the largest marginal
inﬂuence on subjects’ decision to conform.16
Treatment Tpeer measures whether subjects’ decision to follow depends on the strength of a
relationship. The argument being that the better you know a person the more weight you put on
his or her opinions. Facebook is built around the concept of friendship which means we can easily
test for the existence of peer eﬀects. Using four of the ﬁve accounts, we deﬁne what we call a peer
group.17 Imagine again our user’s set of friends, F, illustrated by the bigger circle in the bottom
of Figure 1. Each friend in this set has his or her own set of friends. For a majority of the friends
in F, sets are overlapping but the number of friends in common varies. We identify the friend in
F who has most friends in common with our user (i.e., the largest overlapping area). This friend
is deﬁned as the peer and the group of common friends, illustrated by the shaded area, is the peer
group. In our last treatment, the peer is the one who Likes the update (random assignment of
friends in F automatically splits the peer group into a treatment and a control group). Note that
the peer group is always a subset of F—in our case the fraction of common friends is around 50
percent. Note also that for subjects who do not belong to the peer group, this third treatment is
identical to the ﬁrst treatment described above. The reason for deﬁning our peer using the degree
centrality condition is that we want to study what inﬂuence a central person has in a network
of friends. Within social network theory, several centrality conditions exist. Only counting the
number of nodes directly linked to a speciﬁc subject in the network means degree centrality is
arguably the simplest condition. Other measures, such as the Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987)
or the intercentrality condition (Ballester et al., 2006), also take into account the centrality of the
people you know and how important this indirect link is. At this stage we found it appropriate to
focus on the simplest possible condition.
16Whether or not this result translates to our setting is an open question; nevertheless, we use this result as
guidance.
17Unfortunately, for one user we were unable to use Tpeer as treatment since we did not get access to the peer’s
account.
8Figure 1: Illustration of the experiment
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Table 2 describes the ﬁve users from whose accounts we post updates during the experiment. Ideally,
we would have used accounts from more than one country and with more variation in the year of
birth. However, the fact that we deal with peoples’ private accounts made this diﬃcult. At least,
there is signiﬁcant variation along variables such as gender and number of friends. Although the
44 updates are not evenly distributed across the ﬁve diﬀerent users, they are so across gender and
number of friends.18 Our unit of analysis is the subject, a unique friend-user combination, which
means we have 960 observations for our ﬁrst user (120 friends times 8 updates), 816 observations
for our second user (204 friends times 4 updates) and so on. Consequently we have 710 subjects and
5660 observations in total.19 Columns 6–8 show that treatment condition Tthree was drawn more
frequently than the other two but the diﬀerence is quite small, especially when considering we could
18As much as we wanted to, we could not use every account as frequently.
19A small fraction of the 710 friends are friends with two out of ﬁve users. However, taking this into account does
not aﬀect any results and we therefore prefer the above mentioned, more precise, deﬁnition of a subject (it also makes
sense since this is the level of randomization).
9not use Tpeer for one of the users. Finally, the last two columns give the distribution of responses.
The two outcome variables are deﬁned analogously: if the ﬁrst response from the subject on a given
update was to press the Like button (give a comment), we deﬁne this as a Like (comment). Some
subjects who ﬁrst Liked an update later also commented on the same update but the opposite never
happened (our results are robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of these outcome variables). We note that
90 Likes and 48 comments were made in total during the experiment.
Table 2: The ﬁve Facebook users
Status updates Responses
User Gender Born Friends n Tone Tthree Tpeer Total Like Comment
1 Female 1981 120 960 3 5 - 8 19 8
2M a l e 1 9 8 3 2 0 48 1 6 2 1 1 4 1 0 1 2
3M a l e 1 9 8 3 1 5 26 0 8 1 1 2 4 6 4
4 Female 1983 176 2464 4 5 5 14 42 18
5M a l e 1 9 8 25 88 1 2 4 6 4 1 4 1 3 6
Total 710 5660 14 18 12 44 90 48
We are also able to observe some background characteristics for the 710 subjects. Table 3
summarizes these variables. The table is split in half and thus displays ﬁgures for the total sample
as well as a subset of what we call responders. The smaller sample consists of subjects who at least
once responded to our updates, irrespective of being in a treatment or in a control group when
responding (as seen, responders constitute 16 percent of the sample). The reason for narrowing
the sample in the right-hand panel is to highlight what kind of characteristics pertain to those who
respond. For example, while females are only slightly overrepresented in the total sample they are
in large majority among responders, implying females are more prone to respond to our updates.20
We also note that there are less peer group subjects in the responder sample, and that there is at
least some variation in age in both samples as indicated by a standard deviation of around ﬁve years
in subjects’ age.
Rows 5 and 6 of Table 3 show how active subjects are on Facebook (this data was collected
somewhere midways through the experiment). The mean number of days since a subject’s last
response to any shared content on Facebook is approximately 19. However, as seen, there is much
variation in activity and the real divider lies between those who have responded at least once within
the last three days and those who have not (see Figure 6 included in the Appendix). We use this
information to deﬁne what we denote active subjects, i.e., a subject is active if (and only if) he or
she has responded within three days. Note the diﬀerence between responders and active subjects:
while the ﬁrst refers to those who respond to the updates we post, the latter are users who are active
in a broader sense. As expected, our sample of responders is also more active in general. We use the
distinction between active and less active subjects in later analysis when we investigate the possible
role of observational learning (see Table 6 in section 5.2). Finally, we note that all background
20This is in line with Facebook’s own reporting saying women are behind 62 percent of all activity.
10variables balance between treatment and control groups, which suggests the randomization process
worked well (see Table 8 in the Appendix).
Table 3: Summary statistics
Total Responders
Variable n Mean S.d. n Mean S.d.
Responder 5660 0.155 0.362 878 1 0
Female 5660 0.560 0.496 878 0.720 0.449
Peer group 4700 0.504 0.500 718 0.415 0.493
Year of birth 4018 1981 4.745 710 1980 5.749
Last response 5322 19.141 64.468 852 6.016 9.426
Active 5660 0.428 0.495 878 0.574 0.495
5 Results
5.1 Main Findings
Table 4 summarizes our main ﬁndings by presenting t-tests of diﬀerences in means between treatment
and control groups for each treatment condition, together with the magnitude of the eﬀect, where it
is signiﬁcant. In the ﬁrst row, which presents results from the baseline treatment condition Tone,w e
see that there is no diﬀerence in point estimates between groups.21 Hence, we draw the conclusion
that one unknown user Liking a status update does not increase the probability of further positive
opinions. Moving to the second row, the result clearly alters: when three unknown people Like a
status update, successors are more than two times as likely to press the Like button, and this eﬀect
is highly signiﬁcant. Row 3–5 in Table 4 show what inﬂuence the peer has on subjects’ decision to
Like an update. Beginning with the third row, we report the eﬀect for the entire sample, i.e., we
lump together subjects belonging to the peer group and those who do not. The treatment eﬀect is
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level and relatively large in magnitude. From the last two rows, where
we split the sample, we draw the conclusion that this eﬀect is entirely explained by reactions in
the peer group—subjects are more than four times as likely to express a positive opinion when
they observe their peer’s action. The fact that subjects who have no social relation to the peer are
unaﬀected conﬁrms our previous ﬁnding that one unknown user Liking an update is not enough to
trigger herding behavior. As a complement to this presentation of the main results, Table 9 in the
Appendix presents OLS regressions were we add standard errors clustered on the subject level and
control for user or subject ﬁxed-eﬀects. As seen, results do not change.
21The mean values for responses may seem low at ﬁrst sight but are not surprising considering how interaction on
Facebook works. While some friends log in several times per day others have registered an account but do not use
it. Moreover, because information runs quickly and is very current, active friends will often not observe our status
updates and even if they do they will in most cases simply ignore it.



























































Notes: The table reports sample means and the corresponding standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** = signiﬁcant at the
10, 5 or 1 percent level in a doubled sided t-test.
Figure 2 compares treatment eﬀects across the ﬁve users. Although splitting the sample decreases
the statistical power, there is a clear pattern showing that the probability of Liking as t a t u su p d a t e
is consistently higher in treatment groups.22 This is reassuring since it indicates that the ﬁndings
are not driven by one or a few of the users (note that this is also suggested by the fact that regression
estimates are robust to the inclusion of user ﬁxed eﬀects in Table 9 in the Appendix).

































User 1 User 2 User 3 User 4 User 5
Control Treatment
Note: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
22Although we pool data over all three treatment conditions in Figure 2, results follow the same pattern if we
analyze each condition separately or if we exclude Tone.
12Table 5 looks at gender diﬀerences.23 From the ﬁrst two rows we draw the conclusion that neither
males nor females are aﬀected by Tone, a result which strengthens the conclusion of the zero-eﬀect
already discussed. For Tthree and Tpeer on the other hand, point estimates are considerably higher
in treatment groups independent of gender, which suggests that both males and females are aﬀected
(however, the rather large diﬀerence for male peer group members in the last treatment does not
reach statistical signiﬁcance due to low power).




























































Notes: The table reports sample means and the corresponding standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** = signiﬁcant at the
10, 5 or 1 percent level in a doubled sided t-test. The last treatment condition (Tpeer) includes peer group subjects only.
5.2 Explaining Observed Behavior
We argue that conformity explains the behavior we observe in our experiment. Theory predicts
that conforming behavior occurs when status is signaled through publicly observed actions and
individuals’ concern about social status is suﬃciently high (Bernheim, 1994). With this in mind, we
would like to argue that Facebook constitutes a close to ideal environment for studying conformity.
First, the fact that a large number of users observe each other’s actions means signaling can occur.
Second, much of the communication on the website revolves around attitudes and beliefs, values
likely to be important for establishing and communicating status. Moreover, since there is no
obvious way for users to disagree once a norm is established, conformity pressure is unlikely to
weaken over time. Besides conformity, however, there are arguably two other explanations that are
potentially relevant in our setting: limited attention and observational learning.
Limited attention refers to situations where agents make an optimal choice after delimiting the
23Meta-studies of social inﬂuence (see e.g., Eagly and Carli, 1981) generally ﬁnd that females are more likely than
males to conform in public settings.
13choice set (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2008; Ariely and Simonsohn, 2008;
DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). Such behavior is typically found on ﬁnancial markets where, due
to binding time constraints, investors restrict their attention in some important way. If Facebook
users act under similar conditions, they should use the same rationale, i.e. they limit the number
of updates they actually read but after reading they make their preferred choice without taking
previous responses into account. We consider two cases—saliency and searching—which both fall
under the limited attention category.
Saliency refers to what we observe in Figure 1: status updates with at least one Like potentially
stand out, relative to those without, because of their altered physical appearance (a blue rectangular
area is added beneath the status update). Consequently, updates in treatment groups may have a
higher probability of being read and this in turn could translate into more responses. Note, however,
that the three treatment conditions aﬀect the appearance of an update identically. Thus, if saliency
is driving behavior, we would expect treatment eﬀects in all three treatment conditions. From the
ﬁrst and the last row of Table 4, we know that there is one condition without any eﬀect and we can
thus rule out this channel as explanation for our results.
Searching, on the other hand, has to do with screening in another, more deliberate, sense. In
order to save time or eﬀort, users may look for previous responses to help them ﬁnd the best updates
quickly. Such a search rule will again increase the reading probability for updates in treatment
groups and in the end the number of responses. The increased reading probability may vary with
respect to either the number of persons liking the update or social proximity and hence we do not
expect homogeneous eﬀects across treatments as in the case with saliency. This means we cannot
use the same logic as for saliency above. Instead we perform two tests to see if there is support for
this explanation.
In the ﬁrst test, we study diﬀerences in the type of response given to updates. Since searching
only aﬀects subjects’ choice set and not their response behavior, we expect comments to be aﬀected
in the same way as Likes. Figure 3 shows that while there is a treatment eﬀect for the latter
outcome there is no indication of an eﬀect for comments.24 Hence, this test gives little support
for the searching mechanism (the same logic applies to saliency which means we have further
evidence against that explanation). In control groups, by contrast, response probabilities for the
two outcomes are similar, suggesting that the respective response modes are equally popular in
absence of treatment.
24Since Tone had no treatment eﬀect, we focus on Tthree and Tpeer in Figure 3. Not surprisingly however, Tone
leaves comments unaﬀected as well. Results are unchanged if we restrict attention to peer group subjects in condition
Tpeer (Figure 7 in the Appendix). The graphical evidence is conﬁrmed by t-tests.
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Tthree Tpeer
Control Treatment
Note: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
The searching explanation is further called into question by the ﬁndings presented in Figure 4.
This ﬁgure shows the average number of Likes per update in treatment groups (on the y-axis) as a
function of update quality (on the x-axis). We measure the quality of a status update by the number
of control group subjects liking them (arguably, updates generating more than one Like in control
groups should, in general, be of higher quality than those generating zero or one). We also plot
the line which represents the average number of Likes under a null hypothesis. As seen, treatment
eﬀects are more prevalent for low quality updates.25 But why does this contradict a model that
assumes subjects use previous responses when searching for better updates? An example illustrates
our main point. Imagine a user scrolling through the News Feed and ﬁnding an update that has
been Liked by three unknown users or a peer. This is used as an indicator of high quality and the
subject therefore reads the update. After reading, he or she knows the quality with certainty and
therefore only responds to the update if the quality actually is high. Clearly, this means any eﬀect
would be exaggerated for updates that are of high quality and not, as in the ﬁgure, the other way
around.
Given the success of limited attention as an explanation in other settings, it is perhaps surprising
that this model does not ﬁt our data. Nevertheless, status updates on Facebook are typically so
short and easy to understand that the time or eﬀort you can save by searching for previous responses
(or noticing the blue rectangular area) is limited. Presumably, a more popular screening method is
to limit your attention based on who posted the update, especially so since you will quickly learn
who usually post updates that you like.26
25Our conclusion does not change if we study each treatment separately or if we focus on peer group subjects in
the Tpeer condition (Figure 8 in the Appendix).
26As mentioned in section 2, Facebook simpliﬁes this process through the Top News list view; importantly, such a
search mechanism will only aﬀect the number of potential responders in our experiment, not the results.






























Likes per update in control group
Notes: Point estimates show the average number of Likes gener-
ated in treatment groups. Error bars represent the correspond-
ing standard errors. Treatment condition Tone is excluded.
Setting limited attention aside, we now focus on observational learning. Within the economics
literature, there has been a strong tradition towards using information based models to explain
herding.27 These models assume that agents obtain information by observing each other’s actions;
as a result, successors are inclined to imitate those who are believed to be better informed in an
attempt to maximize intrinsic utility. Cai et al. (2009) provides a good example of a setting where
observational learning is at play. When diners in a Chinese restaurant chain are informed about
the past weeks most popular dishes, the demand for these alternatives increases. Since choices
about what dishes to order naturally involves uncertainty (customers cannot taste the food before
eating), information about prior choices can serve as a quality signal and therefore help individuals
make optimal choices. Contrary to the restaurant setting, choices in our experiment are made
after subjects have experienced the “product” and have been able to evaluate it against comparable
alternatives (as shown in Figure 5 in the Appendix, users can easily read and compare status
updates on the News Feed). Consequently, since the decision we study is made after a private
quality assessment has been made, observational learning should be less important.28 We support
this argument by looking at diﬀerences in behavior between active and inactive subjects in Table
6. If less active subjects change their behavior while those who are more active do not, this speaks
27See Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Anderson and Holt (1997) and Alevy et al. (2007).
28Our main point is that it is unlikely that subjects cannot accurately estimate an update’s quality even in private.
If we compare our study to Cai et al. (2009) again, what we do essentially is to test if customers, who have already
tasted the food, are more likely to say they liked it if someone else said so before (a choice under perfect private
information).
16for the existence of observational learning. The reason is that less active users should beneﬁt
relatively more from any quality signal than those who are active (compare this to a restaurant
environment: new diners typically need more guidance than regular customers who know what they
prefer). Deﬁning a subject’s activity as described in section 4, we see that both active and less active
subjects change their behavior—in fact, for treatment condition Tpeer it is only active subjects who
are aﬀected. In summary, there is little support for information based models such as those outlined
in Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani et al. (1992).












































Notes: The table reports sample means and the corresponding standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** = signiﬁcant at the
10, 5 or 1 percent level in a doubled sided t-test. Tpeer includes peer group subjects only.
6 Discussion
When discussing our results, we ﬁrst want to make clear that any evidence of conformity does
not imply individuals are acting irrationally. In fact, Bernheim’s (1994) main point that modeling
conformity does not require us to abandon the framework of consistent, self-interested optimization
is directly applicable here. In addition to intrinsic preferences, Facebook users may care about
status, which could be thought of as esteem, popularity or respect. If users, because of status
concerns, are reluctant to be among the ﬁrst to Like an update, three previous opinions could serve
as social proof and diminish the predicted negative status eﬀect that otherwise governs behavior.
When a peer Likes an update, on the other hand, users can signal aﬃliation to that person and
possibly reap “status points” by expressing similar preferences.
Another real life situation similar to the one we study is whether to applaud a performer or not.
Even though you like the performance, there is a risk that you will be the only one who applaud;
the presence of a large and unfamiliar crowd could therefore lead to self-censoring. Another person
in the crowd is perhaps not very fond of the show but may still choose to applaud since his or her
neighboring inﬂuential friend does so. Moreover, the fact that the number of people revealing their
opinion matters in our experiment could potentially provide an alternative explanation for the rather
17drastic shift in preferences in favor of extreme right parties, observed across Europe. The typical
explanation for this phenomenon stresses the dissatisfaction against traditional political parties, but
what if individuals had preferences matching those of the extreme right for a long time but were
unwilling to express them (because of status concerns) until a large enough mass had done so as
well? In this perspective, strategies to recover power would likely require diﬀerent methods than the
ones currently adopted. Being closely linked to status concerns, the ﬁndings from this experiment
also resonate with the intriguing fact that soft drinks Coke and Pepsi attracts similar ratings in
consumer blind tests, yet when labels are shown, Coke is preferred. Clearly, other factors than
intrinsic utility must guide this switch in preferences, and they might originate from social status
objectives.
Knowledge about the role of conformity is valuable for a number of reasons and could prove
useful when designing decision environments or assessing the impact of diﬀerent policies. The
argument being that in some cases, we should care less about revealed preferences and focus on
normative preferences (Beshears et al., 2008). One obvious example is board meetings with open
voting procedures. Our results, generalized to this setting, suggest that decisions based on revealed
preferences might be misleading and in the end possibly counterproductive. We also believe that a
healthy suspicion to expressed opinions in general could be important, especially when taking into
account the dynamic process under which speciﬁc opinions have evolved.
As a ﬁnal note it is interesting to observe that conformity exists even though people act in front
of a computer screen where they can easily hide (no one else actually knows whether they have
seen the status update or not). This could suggest that the decision to conform may stem from a
subconscious level, perhaps due to having been a successful strategy through our evolutionary past
(for studies on the evolution of conformity see for example Henrich and Boyd, 2001 and Lachlan
et al., 2004). Related to this topic, Bault et al. (2011) report ﬁndings which “suggest that the brain
is equipped with the ability to detect and encode social signals, make social signals salient, and
then, use these signals to optimize future behavior”.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we set up a natural ﬁeld experiment on the social network service Facebook to
study whether people conform to previously stated opinions. We ﬁnd that conforming behavior
exists and does so to a signiﬁcant degree. Our ﬁndings can be seen as empirical support for the
theoretical model outlined in Bernheim (1994) where people care about social status in addition
to intrinsic preferences. A key feature of the experimental design is the possibility to evaluate the
eﬀects along two important dimensions: the number of previous people expressing their opinion and
social proximity. In accordance with social impact theory developed in Latané (1981), subjects only
conform when there are suﬃciently many people inﬂuencing them or when inﬂuence comes from
someone they have a relation to. Importantly, we carefully address two other relevant explanations
for herding behavior in this setting—limited attention and observational learning—and show that
18these channels are unlikely to drive behavior in the experiment.
Hopefully, our study will stimulate further research on the importance of conformity, on Facebook
and also outside the world of social media. For example, it would be interesting to collaborate with
corporate entities and study if similar eﬀects apply to messages written for commercial purposes. A
more general question is whether monetary incentives aﬀect the decision to conform. Since Liking
a status update (unlike most other decisions) has no pecuniary cost, it may be an easy choice to
follow others. A priori, however, it is diﬃcult to say whether such incentives increase or decrease
the probability to conform. Finally, we encourage attempts to test the generality and the relative
strength of the peer eﬀect found in this paper. While we used the degree centrality condition to
deﬁne our peer, it should be fairly straightforward to evaluate if other conditions—such as the
Bonacich network centrality (Bonacich, 1987)—developed in the literature are more, less or equally
important. Another strategy is to follow the principles developed in Ballester et al. (2006) to locate
the friend with maximum impact.
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21Appendix
Figure 5: Print screen of a Facebook Homepage




Tone I￿m probably the only tourist who has visited Pisa but didn’t see the tower...
Tone I don’t give a damn about your tax refund!
Tone
Party tonight. Prepare myself with intravenous drip and pain killers to be
alive tomorrow...
Tone Plan - to knit a hat
Tthree Love the warm weather. STAY!
Tthree A warm welcome to you, dishwasher!
Tthree I’ll be surprised if I don’t get an A on today’s exam
Tthree Towards the beach!
Tpeer Rhubarb desert before the running race. Hope the jogging tights still ﬁts...
Tpeer Aloha Hawaii!
Tpeer
Have the same posture as the Hunchback of Notre Dame. Lumbago please go
away!
Tpeer Premiere on the PGA tour ;)
Note: Updates in the experiment were in Swedish, here we present translated versions.
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Notes: The table reports sample means and the corresponding standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** = signiﬁcant at the
10, 5 or 1 percent level in a doubled sided t-test.
24Table 9: OLS regressions
Dependent variable: Like
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Tthree -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Tpeer -0.008 -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Tone × Treatment -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Tthree × Treatment 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tpeer × Treatment 0.015** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
User FE NO YES NO
Subject FE NO NO YES
Observations 5,660 5,660 5,660
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.181
Notes: The control group for Tone is used as constant. Standard errors clustered on the subject level in parenthesis. *, **, ***
= signiﬁcant at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level.





































Note: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.































Likes per update in control group
Notes: Point estimates show the average number of Likes gener-
ated in treatment groups. Error bars represent the correspond-
ing standard errors. Treatment condition Tone is excluded.
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